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log	L	 ‐2,849.213	 MA(3)	 0.374	
(z	=	5.39)	
	 	 MA(4)	 0.239	
(z	=	5.30)	
	
Note:	The	dependent	variable	is	the	first	difference	of	Michigan	unemployment,	
or	∆ .		
	
Based	on	numerous	trial‐and‐error	attempts,	the	best	fit	of	the	
autoregressive	and	moving	average	structure	is	P	=	1	and	Q	=	4,	respectively,	and	
our	estimate	of	the	impact	of	the	bailout	is	largely	unaffected	by	the	choice	of	P	and	
Q.	Finally,	the	1999	strike	caused	Michigan	unemployment	to	substantially	deviate	
from	its	path	by	temporarily	increasing	unemployment	by	over	41,500	workers.	
Fortunately	this	increase	in	unemployment	was	erased	at	the	culmination	of	the	
strike.		
	
Effect	on	Transfer	Payments	and	Tax	Revenue		
	
	 Our	next	step	is	to	transform	the	reduction	in	Michigan	unemployment	to	
changes	in	the	public	budget.	Table	2	summarizes	this	calculation,	which	we	
perform	using	three	different	numbers	for	the	auto	bailout’s	marginal	effect	 ,:	the	
lower	95%	confidence	interval	estimate,	the	point	estimate	from	Table	1,	and	the	
upper	95%	confidence	interval	estimate.		
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Table	2:	Calculation	of	Transfer	Payments	and	Tax	Revenue	Effects	
	
	 lower	95%		
estimate	
( 6,677.983 	
point		
estimate	
( 7,687.595 	
upper	95%		
estimate	
( 8,608.207 	
Worker	months	
saved	from	unemp.	
over	bailout	period	
(54	mos.)	
360,611	 415,130		 464,843	
Private	earnings	
gains	
$3,767,664,585	 $4,337,279,598	 $4,856,681,524	
Amount	saved	in	
unemp.	insurance	
($1,448	per	mo.)	
$552,164,847	 $601,108,240	 $673,092,664	
Increase	in	income	
tax	revenue	
($545.92	per	mo.)		
$196,864,757	 $226,627,770	 $253,767,091	
	
Increase	in	Social	
Security	and	
Medicare	
receipts10	
$542,962,330	 $625,050,182	 $699,901,771	
Public	Budget	
Impact		
$1,291,991,934	 $1,452,786,192	 $1,626,761,526	
	 	
We	begin	by	finding	the	number	of	worker‐months	saved	from	
unemployment	by	multiplying	the	monthly	marginal	effect	of	the	bailout	by	the	
number	of	months	of	the	bailout	period	(54	months).	We	also	calculate	the	private	
income	gains	from	remaining	employed,	which	is	the	number	of	worker‐months	
saved	from	unemployment	multiplied	by	average	quarterly	earnings	in	Michigan.	
Quarterly	earnings	data	are	from	the	Industry	Census	of	Employment	&	Wages	
published	by	the	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics.	Since	quarterly	earnings	change	over	
time,	we	multiply	the	number	of	saved	worker‐months	by	three	(to	make	it	
quarterly),	and	then	multiply	this	product	by	quarterly	earnings	in	that	period.	
Mathematically,	this	approach	equates	to	3 ∑ 	for	all	18	quarters	(q)	in	
the	bailout	period.		
	
																																																								
10 For most of the bailout period, the Social Security tax rate is 6.2% and the Medicare tax rate is 1.45%. 
These taxes are paid by both employers and employees, meaning the total tax rate on income for these 
two programs is 15.3%. However, in 2011 and 2012 the Social Security tax rate for employees was 
lowered to 4.2%, changing the total tax rate on income to 13.3%. Our calculations reflect this change. 
Unfortunately we cannot incorporate two other tax changes during the bailout period. First, employers 
did not have to pay Social Security tax for new hires from February 2009 until the end of the year. Second, 
high income workers pay an additional 0.9 percentage points on their Medicare tax beginning in 2013, 
which overlaps the bailout period by one year. See http://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/taxRates.html.  
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	 The	estimates	for	worker‐months	saved	from	unemployment	and	the	
resulting	private	earnings	gains	are	used	to	calculate	the	impact	on	the	public	
budget.	According	to	the	State	of	Michigan	Department	of	Licensing	and	Regulatory	
Affairs,	unemployment	benefits	cost	an	estimated	$1,448	for	each	worker‐month,	
which	we	multiply	by	the	number	of	worker	months	saved	from	unemployed	to	
calculate	the	amount	saved	in	unemployment	insurance.	In	addition,	we	refer	to	the	
tax	tables	published	by	the	Internal	Revenue	Service	for	each	year	of	the	bailout	
period	to	calculate	the	average	amount	of	income	tax	paid	by	a	worker	earning	the	
average	Michigan	salary	in	that	period.		The	average	annual	income	tax	payment	is	
$6,551,	or	$545.92	per	month.		The	increase	in	private	earnings	is	used	to	calculate	
the	increase	in	tax	revenues	for	Social	Security	and	Medicare.	We	calculate	the	
increase	in	tax	revenues	for	these	programs	by	multiplying	the	increase	in	private	
earnings	by	the	total	tax	rate.		
	
	 The	final	row	calculates	the	impact	on	the	public	budget,	which	sums	the	
decrease	in	unemployment	insurance	payments,	the	increase	in	income	tax	revenue,	
and	the	increase	in	Social	Security	and	Medicare	tax	revenues.	We	estimate	the	
public	budget	improved	by	between	about	$1.3	and	$1.6	billion.		
		
The	Pension	Benefit	Guaranty	Corporation	
	
Pensions	were	a	key	aspect	of	the	debate	to	rescue	GM	and	Chrysler.		In	fact,	
the	financial	situation	of	the	government’s	Pension	Benefit	Guaranty	Corporation	
(PBGC)	created	a	situation	where	the	government	faced	either	a	large	bailout	
payment	or,	assuming	GM	failed,	a	large	payment	to	the	PBGC.		
	
After	the	recession	during	the	early	2000s,	GM’s	pension	fund	was	incredibly	
weak.	Specifically,	the	fund	contained	over	$20	billion	less	than	what	the	company	
needed	to	pay	the	approximate	400,000	retirees	$7	billion	each	year.11	In	order	to	
address	this,	GM	sold	over	$14	billion	of	bonds	the	following	year	and	injected	the	
revenues	into	their	pension	fund.	This	combined	with	the	proceeds	from	the	sale	of	
GM’s	Hughes	Electronics	subsidiary	amounted	in	over	$18	billion.12	As	a	result	of	
contributing	this	much	more	than	GM’s	minimum	requirement,	federal	law	did	not	
require	them	to	make	any	more	contributions	until	2013.	
	
	 However,	the	pension	fund’s	surplus	was	short‐lived.	Increasing	health	care	
costs	for	retired	workers	forced	GM	to	spend	billions	of	dollars	that	could	have	gone	
to	company	and	product	innovation.	As	GM’s	market	share	decreased	at	the	benefit	
of	foreign	competitors,	the	company	began	major	downsizing	projects	and	an	
abnormally	large	number	of	employees	retiring	early.	In	2007,	the	fund	was	worth	
																																																								
11 Viceira, Luis M., and Helen Tung. "General Motors U.S. Pension Funds." Harvard Business School Case 
206‐001. July 2005. Web. 28 June 2015. 
12 Walsh, Mary Williams. "G.M.’s Pension Fund Stays Afloat, Against the Odds." The New York Times. The 
New York Times, 24 Nov. 2008. Web. 26 June 2015. 
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$104	billion	with	only	$85	billion	in	obligations,	but	by	2008	it	was	underfunded	by	
$13	billion.13		By	2011,	the	fund	was	underfunded	by	$25.4	billion.14	
	
	 If	GM	failed,	taxpayers	likely	would	have	had	to	pay	for	at	least	a	vast	portion	
of	these	pensions.		Typically	when	a	company	files	for	Chapter	11	Bankruptcy,	the	
pension	plan	gets	handed	over	to	the	PBGC,	which	funds	itself	primarily	by	taking	
over	what	remains	in	the	pension	funds	of	failed	companies.		It	guarantees	pension	
promises,	but	only	up	to	maximum	defined	limits.	Thus,	young	retirees	(such	as	
many	who	left	GM)	are	particularly	at	risk	for	losing	benefits	because	they	have	
longer	pension	plans.		Around	the	time	that	GM	first	requested	funds	from	the	
government,	the	PBGC	was	already	underfunded	by	around	$11	billion.		It	estimated	
that	if	required	to	take	on	GM’s	pension	obligations,	their	deficit	would	increase	by	
around	$20	billion.15		The	PBGC	is	not	technically	a	wholly	public	organization,	but	it	
was	created	under	the	Employee	Retirement	Income	Security	Act	in	1974	and	the	
Secretaries	of	Labor,	Commerce,	and	Treasury	are	on	its	board	of	directors.		Thus,	in	
cases	of	extreme	fund	shortages,	it	is	likely	that	the	US	government	would	have	to	
intervene.		
	
	 Fortunately,	GM	was	not	required	to	defer	their	pension	plans	to	the	PBGC.		
Instead,	the	bailout	efforts	allowed	GM	to	offer	lump‐sum	payments	to	42,000	of	
their	retirees	and	transfer	responsibility	for	76,000	plans	to	Prudential	Insurance.		
This	reduced	GM’s	pension	obligations	by	an	estimated	$26	billion.16	Chrysler	
stopped	issuing	public	pension	reports	when	it	became	private	in	2007,	but	the	
bailout	likely	saved	their	funds	from	a	similar	fate.	Thus,	despite	the	widespread	
debate	on	exactly	how	much	the	U.S.	government	saved	in	other	areas,	it	is	clear	that	
the	$9.3	billion	loss	was	likely,	at	a	minimum,	offset	by	the	funds	saved	on	pension	
relief.	
	
Conclusion		
	
	 The	auto	bailout	provides	an	interesting	case	study	in	fiscal	policy	stimulus.	
While	the	prospect	of	GM	and	Chrysler	shutting	down	was	bleak,	the	cost	to	save	
these	companies	was	significant,	particularly	in	light	of	an	uncertain	future	heading	
into	the	recession.	We	conservatively	estimate	the	auto	bailout	saved	7,700	worker‐
months	in	Michigan	from	unemployment	for	each	month	over	a	four‐and‐a‐half	year	
period,	which	translates	to	between	$1.3	and	$1.6	billion	in	public	savings.	In	
addition,	the	financial	condition	of	the	PBGC	would	have	likely	forced	the	
government	to	provide	an	additional	$20	billion	in	support	had	the	government	not	
																																																								
13 "A Giant Falls." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 06 June 2009. Web. 26 June 2015. 
14 Elliott, Douglas J. What Happens to the GM Pensions in Bankruptcy? Rep. The Brookings Institution, 29 
May 2009. Web. 26 June 2015. 
15 Ibid 
16 Akerson, Dan. "The State of General Motors." Annual Meeting of Stockholders of General Motors Co. 
Detroit. 12 June 2012. General Motors. Web. 26 June 2015. 
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intervened.	After	an	initial	investment	of	$80	billion,	the	net	cost	of	the	auto	bailout	
turned	out	to	be	$9.3	billion,	or	$17.2	billion	if	the	ARRA	payouts	are	included.		
	
	 We	stress	that	our	estimates	of	the	auto	bailout	impacts	are	conservative.	For	
example,	we	use	a	relatively	short	time	frame	for	the	auto	bailout	stimulus,	four‐
and‐a‐half	years	or	18	quarters,	compared	to	the	empirical	literature	that	employs	
impulse	response	functions	to	measure	fiscal	policy	effects.	If	we	extend	the	auto	
bailout	period	to	the	end	of	our	sample	frame,	which	makes	the	bailout	period	just	
under	six	years	or	23	and	two‐thirds	quarters,	the	estimate	for	worker‐months	
saved	from	unemployment	becomes	roughly	16,400	per	month	with	a	p‐value	less	
than	0.001.	The	jump	in	the	estimate	stems	from	Michigan’s	improving	
unemployment	picture	even	relative	to	the	rest	of	the	country	(see	Figure	3).	Over	
the	new	bailout	period,	this	translates	to	between	$3.35	and	$4	billion	in	public	
budget	savings.		
	
	 A	second	reason	that	our	estimate	is	conservative	is	that	our	comparison	
group	might	be	overly	optimistic.	The	ARIMA	setup	that	we	employ	estimates	the	
impact	of	the	auto	bailout	by	comparing	the	first‐difference	of	unemployment	
between	bailout	and	non‐bailout	periods.	Prior	to	the	bailout,	the	first‐difference	of	
unemployment	is	stationary	around	zero.	This	means	the	auto	bailout’s	effect	is	
calculated	based	on	a	comparison	group	of	monthly	unemployment	changes	that	
hover	around	zero.	But	had	the	government	not	intervened	and	let	GM	and	Chrysler	
close,	monthly	unemployment	changes	would	likely	remained	positive	for	a	
significant	time	period	as	capital	is	transferred	to	other	uses	and	labor	migrates	out.		
	
Though	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper,	there	were	numerous	sources	of	
private	gain	as	a	result	of	the	auto	bailout.	These	include	wage	effects	from	lowering	
unemployment	and	gains	in	the	financial	sector	to	those	holding	stock.	In	addition,	
Goolsbee	and	Krueger	argue	the	auto	bailout	benefits	are	not	limited	to	Michigan,	
stating	“in	all	likelihood the	Great	Recession	would	have	been	deeper	and	longer,	
and	the	recovery	that	began	in	mid‐2009	would	have	been	weaker”	(p.4).	However,	
in	similar	estimations	for	Ohio,	Indiana,	and	Kentucky,	which	are	three	states	that	
also	have	many	auto	industry	employees,	the	auto	bailout	had	an	insignificant	effect	
on	unemployment.	This	is	likely	because	these	states,	compared	to	Michigan,	more	
closely	follow	national	unemployment	during	the	auto	bailout	period.	Our	belief	is	
the	auto	bailout	likely	spilled	into	these	states,	and	perhaps	the	rest	of	the	country,	
but	only	after	Michigan	was	saved	from	the	closings	of	GM	and	Chrysler.		
	
Even	though	the	auto	bailout	produced	positive	short	term	effects,	it	remains	
to	be	seen	whether	keeping	GM	and	Chrysler	afloat	is	a	wise	long	term	strategy.	
American	automobile	companies	face	increasing	pressure	for	foreign	firms,	several	
of	whom	have	a	reputation	for	high	quality	cars.	Nevertheless,	we	hope	our	
estimates	can	be	used	to	predict	the	efficacy	of	fiscal	policy	stimulus	in	future	
decisions.		
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